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REVOKING SUPERVISED RELEASE 
IN THE AGE OF LEGAL CANNABIS 
ZACHARY J. WEINER† 
 INTRODUCTION 
Supervised release—part of the original sentence following a 
guilty verdict1—is a system by which federal probation officers 
monitor prisoners released from federal prison.2  In imposing su-
pervised release, sentencing judges set conditions that each 
supervisee must comply with, or risk reincarceration at the 
discretion of the sentencing judge.3  Certain conditions of super-
vised release are prescribed by statute and others are crafted by 
judges.4 
If a defendant violates the terms of supervised release by 
possessing cannabis products, the statutory regime provides the 
sentencing judge with two options: revoke the defendant’s super-
vised release and reincarcerate her or, alternatively, release the 
defendant from the supervised release program altogether.5  
While district judges are not often confronted with cannabis-
related revocations , as state and federal cannabis laws have 
diverged, judges have increasingly faced serious questions of pe-
nological philosophy when asked to punish those engaged in 
cannabis use sanctioned by state law but proscribed by federal 
law.6  This Note highlights the sources of those burgeoning areas 
of conflict and suggest numerous ways that these conflicts might 
be resolved. 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., St. John’s University 
School of Law (2020); B.S., Baruch College (2011). 
1 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2018). 
2 See generally id. § 3583. 
3 Id. § 3583(d), (e). 
4 Id. § 3583(d). This provision requires that judges issue certain conditions as 
part of all supervised release sentences, including nonpossession of any controlled 
substance, and also allows judges to craft their own additional conditions. Id. 
5 Id. § 3583(e)(1), (g)(1). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 340–41 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
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A recent case in the Eastern District of New York is instruc-
tive.  On July 13, 2018, Senior District Judge Jack Weinstein 
changed Tyran Trotter’s life forever.7  Trotter appeared before 
Judge Weinstein for a violation of his supervised release for the 
use of recreational marijuana.8 
As Judge Weinstein illustrated, Trotter was a troubled teen 
born into difficult circumstances:   
He never knew his father.  His mother struggles with drug ad-
diction.  His brother was apparently murdered.  At fourteen he 
was placed in foster care.  By sixteen he had half-a-dozen ar-
rests on his record.  He was convicted of a federal drug distri-
bution charge and sentenced to two years imprisonment before 
he could legally drink alcohol.  Now twenty-two years old, Trotter 
is on federal supervised release trying to lead a productive life, 
with a chronic problem holding him back: marijuana addiction.9 
Judge Weinstein went on to describe how Trotter complied with 
the terms of his supervised release, aside from his marijuana 
use.10  Instead of revoking Trotter’s supervised release in accor-
dance with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), Judge Weinstein used his dis-
cretion to terminate Trotter’s supervised release altogether, 
allowing Trotter to reintegrate into society on his own, but with-
out any of the helpful guidance and supervision that supervised 
release provides.11 
The wooden rules that govern how federal judges must deal 
with those who violate their terms of supervised release leave 
judges, like Judge Weinstein, with but two choices when faced 
with a violation resulting from drug use: (1) send the violator to 
prison and prescribe a further term of supervised release;12 or 
(2) terminate the violator’s supervised release completely and let 
her go free without any further monitoring.13  In a world where 
cannabis products are now legal in some form in thirty-three 
 
7 Id. at 341. 
8 Id. at 342. 
9 Id. at 341. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. The court explained that continuing supervision, a decision that would re-
quire reincarceration, would not serve the rehabilitative goals of supervised release. 
Id. 
12 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1) (2018) (requiring revocation of supervised release on a 
finding of drug possession). 
13 Id. § 3583(e)(1) (permitting the court to “terminate a term of supervised re-
lease” after considering certain factors). 
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states,14 there remains no procedural mechanism that allows 
judges to keep violators under supervision and at the same time 
not send them back to prison for cannabis use.15  This is true 
regardless of whether the offense arises from medicinal or recrea-
tional use, or whether the use is legal or illegal in the particular 
jurisdiction in question.16 
The inflexibility of the supervised release statute is a vestige 
of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), which was passed in 
1970, and is still used today to categorize the severity of drug use 
by defendants on supervised release.17  Under the CSA, marijuana 
remains in the most severe category of illegal drugs—Schedule 
1—and a judge who finds that a defendant has used marijuana 
must revoke that defendant’s supervised release and prescribe a 
further prison term.18  This is true whether the drug was pre-
scribed by a physician and purchased at a pharmacy, or whether 
it was bought on the street for purely recreational use.19  As a re-
sult, many sentences for non-drug-related crimes are artificially 
extended due to drug-related violations, even when cannabis is 
being used for legitimate therapeutic purposes.20  While Trotter’s 
case is unrelated to the therapeutic use of marijuana, Judge 
Weinstein’s characterization of supervised release and its inter-
action with marijuana law is nonetheless pertinent: “[f]or some, 
supervised release can be a trap where they bounce between 
supervision and prison.”21  This Note examines the structure of 
supervised release and how it interplays with legal cannabis use. 
In Part I, this Note discusses the history and beginnings, as 
well as the statutory framework, of the supervised release re-
gime.  Part II deals with the changing landscape of marijuana 
law at the state level and the changing public view of marijuana 
in general.  Part III discusses how conflict between the super-
vised release statutes and state law raises a number of serious 
constitutional and prudential problems.  Lastly, Part IV suggests 
 
14 Jiachuan Wu & Daniella Silva, Map: See the States Where Marijuana Is Legal, 
NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018, 11:04 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/map-
see-if-marijuana-legal-your-state-n938426 [https://perma.cc/CR7Y-XTKD]. 
15 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), (g)(1). 
16 See United States v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
17 See id. at 832–33 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005)). 
18 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1); Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 832–3. 
19 Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (citing United States v. Landa, 281 F. Supp. 2d 
1139, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Raich, 545 U.S. at 27). 
20 See United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(explaining how revocation of supervised release can result in long prison terms). 
21 Id. at 363. 
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a number of narrow changes to the supervised release law that 
may alleviate some of these problems. 
I.  SUPERVISED RELEASE 
A.  Statutory History and Legislative Intent 
Supervised release was created as part of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”)22 and has a long and often misunder-
stood history.  The motivations behind the act were primarily to 
reform the federal sentencing regime to promote uniformity and 
fairness.23  At the time, like many states today, the federal crimi-
nal sentencing structure was based on indeterminate sentence 
lengths capped with release decisions made by parole boards.24  
In a parole system, a judge prescribes a sentence with a mini-
mum and maximum length.25  Once the prisoner exceeds the 
minimum time in jail, the parole board may decide whether to 
allow that prisoner to complete the sentence outside of jail.26 
From the creation of the parole system in 1910 until the mid-
1980s, legislatures argued that it was effective, because the pa-
role system promoted parity with state systems, and that it was 
fiscally responsible to release rehabilitated prisoners.27  Parole 
boards, at least in theory, were meant to narrowly tailor the 
sentence of each inmate in a way that would best maximize the 
penological outcomes from each case.28  Parole boards were vest-
ed with extraordinary powers to make individualized decisions 
with respect to each individual prisoner.29  However, as the num-
ber of federal prisoners rose over time, this kind of high-touch 
system became increasingly unworkable.30 
 
22 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal 
Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 190 (2013). 
23 Id. at 189–90. 
24 Id. at 188–89. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of 
Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U.L. REV. 958, 984 (2013). 
28 See id. at 986–87. 
29 Wiley v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 380 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (citing 
United States v. Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1968)). 
30 See Doherty, supra note 27, at 988. Over time the parole boards became more 
removed from the actual facts on the ground. Eventually the parole board was in-
stalled in Washington D.C. and was charged with dealing with all federal prisoners 
throughout the country. Id. 
2020] REVOKING SUPERVISED RELEASE 235 
The “War on Drugs,” conceived by the Nixon administration 
and continued through the Clinton years and into the adminis-
tration of George W. Bush31 put an acute strain on the justice 
system, inundating courts and prisons with a large number of 
new convictions on drug-related charges.32  The number of indi-
viduals serving time for drug-related offenses increased from 
19,000 in 1980 to 242,200 in 2009, an increase of 1,175%.33  This 
leap in the number of participants in the federal criminal system 
made it difficult for parole boards to keep up with the pace of 
cases crossing their desks and ultimately increased the amount 
of randomness in each parole determination.34  Over time, a per-
ception of randomness and lack of transparency began to 
emerge.35  Confidence in the system eroded, and Congress began 
to pursue a replacement.36 
In 1984, partially in an attempt to reduce the sense of 
unfairness in the parole system, Congress passed the SRA to 
standardize the way in which each prisoner was released from 
jail.37  The Act required that each inmate serve her entire sen-
tence in prison, followed by a term of supervision assigned at the 
judge’s discretion.38  The amount of supervised release that could 
be assigned was commensurate with the severity of the crime 
committed by the defendant.39  Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1)–
(3) divides the amount of allowed supervised release by the class 
of each of defendant’s offenses.40  Class A and B offenders may re-
ceive up to five years; Class C and D, up to three years; and Class 
E and misdemeanor offenders, up to one year.41 
Given that the new supervised release regime was not meant 
as a replacement for years spent in prison, the purpose of 
 
31 See generally A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war [https://perma.cc/C5B3-W9ZL] 
(last visited May 30, 2020). 
32 John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, 
Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 173–74 (2015). 
33 Id. at 181. 
34 See Doherty, supra note 27, at 991–92. 
35 Id. at 991. 
36 Id. at 992–93. “[T]he vagueness and uncertainty created by indeterminate sen-
tencing were ‘prima facie evils,’ at odds with the certainty and predictability that we 
otherwise value in the law.” Id. at 992. 
37 Scott-Hayward, supra note 22, at 190. 
38 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A(2)(b) (US SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (2018). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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supervised release differs from that of parole.42  In its legislative 
conception, supervised release was intended to benefit the super-
visee.43  It was to be a service to help the supervisee reintegrate 
into society.44  This goal was meant to be non-punitive—su-
pervisees who have completed their jail sentences have paid their 
debts to society, and society is simply helping them overcome 
whatever stumbling blocks to rehabilitation they may encounter 
in their renewed civilian lives.45 
As a result, the original statute did not provide for a pos-
sibility of revocation.46  However, as a result of skepticism 
surrounding the new statutory regime and growing political 
pressures to be strong on crime—before the SRA went into effect 
as a result of a lengthy agency enactment process—Congress 
passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which codified “manda-
tory terms of supervised release for certain drug offenses” 
coupled with the possibility of revocation.47  “Supervised release 
as originally envisaged by the SRA was never implemented, and 
rather than being need-based, . . . its imposition became offense-
based.”48  
In practice, therefore, supervised release has taken on a 
unique hybrid role in the criminal law, serving both rehabilita-
tive and punitive purposes.49  On the one hand, the statutes call for 
certain mandatory conditions and include revocation provisions 
to allow for punishment when conditions are violated,50 while on 
the other hand, mental health, narcotics, alcohol, and financial 
counseling, as well as other rehabilitative programs, are routine 
features.51  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) provides for the fol-
lowing mandatory conditions of supervised release: “[t]he court 
 
42 United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“The 
purpose of federal supervised release is to assist people who have served prison 
terms with rehabilitation and reintegration into the law-abiding community.”). 
43 Scott-Hayward, supra note 22, at 190. 
44 Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 339. 
45 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983) (noting that all the disciplinary functions of 
the criminal justice system should be satisfied in jail, not while on supervised release). 
46 Id. 
47 Scott-Hayward, supra note 22, at 191. 
48 Id. at 191–92. 
49 See United States v. Partlow, 372 F. App’x 353, 354 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “supervised release ha[s] both punitive and rehabilitative aspects”). 
50 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2018).  
51 See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48 n.4 (2007) (psychological 
counseling); United States v. Williams, 212 F. App’x 902, 903 (11th Cir. 2006) (drug 
counseling); United States v. Thomas, 346 F. Supp. 3d 326, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(alcohol counseling).  
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shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that 
the defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local 
crime . . . , that the defendant make restitution . . . , and that the 
defendant not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.”52  But a 
judge may also craft any specialized conditions that they see fit 
so long as those conditions are “reasonably related to the factors 
set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D);” 
do not involve any deprivation of liberty greater than those 
approved by section 3553; and are consistent with the policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.53  This statu-
tory regime allows judges the opportunity, but does not impose 
the requirement, to prescribe conditions that will ultimately help 
prisoners reintegrate into society, while at the same time 
requiring certain mandatory punitive conditions.  
Given this statutory structure, judges often view the 
purposes of supervised release differently.  For some, supervised 
release has become a de facto extension of prison sentences, 
meant to continue protecting the community and deterring 
criminal conduct.54  As a result, many judges suffice themselves 
with only the standard conditions of supervised release imposed 
by statute and do not mold conditions on an individual basis for 
each defendant.55  Others, like Judge Weinstein, view rehabilita-
tion as the primary purpose of supervision and may even resort 
to ending a term of supervision that is not benefiting the 
supervisee.56 
 
52 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (emphasis added). 
53 Id. The above-mentioned § 3553(a) factors include “the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
Id. § 3553(a)(1), as well as “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct,” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B); “to protect the public from 
further crimes,” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C); and “to provide the defendant with needed edu-
cational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner,” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
54 See, e.g., United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 1992)).  
55 See United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“I, like 
other trial judges, have provided unnecessary conditions of supervised release and 
unjustifiably punished supervisees for their marijuana addiction . . . .”). 
56 See id. (“The purpose of federal supervised release is to assist people who have 
served prison terms with rehabilitation and reintegration in the law-abiding 
community.”).  
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B. Procedural Considerations 
It is also important to note the uniqueness of the process by 
which a revocation action comes before a judge.  Unlike most re-
lief granted in our adversarial system, supervised release may be 
revoked pursuant to an ex parte proceeding initiated by the judge 
upon a parole officer’s report that a violation has occurred.57  No 
grand jury indictment or motion practice is required.58  Reports 
by probation officers—agents of the judicial branch of gov-
ernment,59 whose duties include keeping the sentencing court 
informed of a supervisee’s compliance with, and violations of, 
conditions of supervised release60—may serve as the lone basis 
for a revocation proceeding.61 
Upon report of a violation, the sentencing judge will gener-
ally issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the supervisee62 who 
will then be subject to a preliminary hearing, and eventually an 
evidentiary proceeding where the judge will determine if the 
violation has in fact occurred.63  Once satisfied by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that revocation is in order, the judge will 
prescribe a sentence for the violation in accordance with the 
statute.64  The entire process of “violating” a supervisee can occur 
without any action by the United States Attorney.65 
C. Constitutional Considerations 
When the particulars of supervised release are viewed in the 
abstract, they beg an obvious question: how can the Constitution 
countenance a penal proceeding that may result in a restriction 
or even revocation of a defendant’s liberty without all of the  
 
 
57 18 U.S.C. § 3606. 
58 See id. 
59 Probation and Pretrial Officers and Officer Assistants, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-and- 
pretrial-officers-and-officer [https://perma.cc/F7BU-VDL6] (last visited May 30, 2020). 
60 18 U.S.C. § 3603(8). 
61 United States v. Mejia-Sanchez, 172 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999); 
18 U.S.C. § 3606. The probation officer may make the arrest with or without a 
warrant. Id. 
62 18 U.S.C. § 3606. 
63 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b).  
64 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). 
65 See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. Normally, the United States 
Attorney will appear to represent the government at a revocation hearing, but no 
action is required by the office of the United States Attorney to initiate the 
proceedings. 
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normal trappings of due process?  How can a judge, without the 
guidance of a jury, find a supervisee guilty of a violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence? 
The Supreme Court of the United States took up this very 
question in Johnson v. United States.  The Court held that since 
any punishment for violation of supervised release cannot exceed 
the term of imprisonment prescribed for the original sentence, 
any punishment for violation relates back to the original crime.66  
The Court pointed out that the government wisely disavows any 
assertion that punishment for a violation of supervised release is 
actually a punishment for the violation rather than the original 
crime because, in so doing, they avoid “serious constitutional 
questions.”67  In short, when a supervisee is sentenced for a vio-
lation, the court employs a legal fiction that ties the new 
sentence to the original criminal act.68 
Given the weight of the rights in question, the statutes are 
narrowly construed.  For example, the Court in United States v. 
Haymond invalidated section 3583(k), a special incarceration pro-
vision for supervisees that violate terms of release prescribed 
pursuant to a sentencing for certain sexual offenses.69  Because 
the length of the sentences for violation of supervised release 
mandated by this section are higher than the defendant’s maxi-
mum sentence for the original crime, they cannot be handed 
down without a fresh prosecution.70  Without operation of the 
relation-back principle in Johnson, a new trial with all of the 
rights and trappings provided by the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments is required.71 
D. Revocation 
When a supervisee violates a non-narcotic related condition 
of release, the judge has a number of courses of action allowed by 
statute.  She may (1) “terminate a term of supervised release and 
discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration 
of one year . . . if [she] is satisfied that such action is warranted 
by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of 
 
66 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000).  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2374, 2382 (2019).  
70 Id. at 2382. 
71 Id. 
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justice”72—this being the course of action taken by Judge 
Weinstein in Trotter;73 (2) “extend a term of supervised release” if 
the original term was not imposed at the maximum length 
allowed by statute;74 (3) revoke supervised release based on a 
preponderance of the evidence and sentence the defendant to a 
term of imprisonment not more than the maximum time allowed 
for supervised release of the original offense;75 (4) order house 
arrest;76 or (5) simply do nothing.77 
However, a violation relating to possession of a controlled 
substance is different.  A substance-related violation must be pun-
ished by imprisonment or, if the judge decides that justice so 
requires, termination of supervision.78  Unlike other violations 
that allow judges to decide what the best course of action may be, 
the possession of controlled substances, regardless of their status 
under state law, requires a punitive response.79  Therefore, more 
often than not, defendants found guilty of a violation of su-
pervised release for possession of controlled substances have 
their supervision automatically revoked and are sentenced to 
prison and a further term of supervised release.80  It is by the 
mechanical application of these provisions that defendants 
sentenced to one felony can be sentenced to successive terms of 
prison and supervised release.81 
But judges are left with no good choices.  Their only other 
choice—termination—comes with the consequence of the super-
visee no longer having access to all the rehabilitative services 
that would otherwise be available under proper supervision.82  
Judges are forced into a unique choice when faced with controlled 
substance violations: punish those who violate supervised release 
or simply cut them loose, regardless of whether those outcomes 
serve the interests of society or the supervisee.  This unique in-
 
72 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (2018).  
73 United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).  
74 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). 
75 Id. § 3583(e)(3). 
76 Id. § 3583(e)(4). 
77 Id. § 3583(e). Revocation is permissive. It is a right the court may exercise, 
but not one that it must exercise, in non-drug-related cases. 
78 Id. § 3583(e)(1), (g)(1). 
79 Id. § 3583(g); see also United States v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010). 
80 United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (admon-
ishing trial judges for mechanically using supervised release far too liberally). 
81 Id. 
82 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
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flexibility, reserved for drug violations alone, highlights how the 
statutes have become outmoded by the changing place of canna-
bis in society both for therapeutic and recreational uses.  These 
issues will be further addressed in Parts III and IV below.  
E. Bad Choices 
When one understands the unique legal device that is super-
vised release, it becomes clear how defendants can easily fall into 
the cycle of serving a prison sentence, followed by supervised 
release, a violation, and then further prison time.  One conviction 
can lead to multiple prison sentences and multiple terms of 
supervised release.83  However, when it comes to drug-related 
violations of supervised release where the statute takes the 
discretion away from the judge, requiring that supervised release 
be revoked or terminated,84 the likelihood of this cycle occurring 
is far higher.85 
In Trotter, Judge Weinstein avoided subjecting a young, 
marijuana-addicted defendant to this merry-go-round of prison and 
supervised release by using his power under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) 
to terminate the defendant’s supervised release in the interest of 
justice.86  This decision represented a choice by Judge Weinstein 
to pick the lesser of two evils.  He preferred terminating super-
vised release in the hope that the defendant could get his life 
back on track without help of parole officers rather than sending 
him to jail for a minor drug offense.87  
However, the disposition in Trotter is an outlier.  Courts in 
other jurisdictions often mechanically send violators back to 
prison.88  Courts in at least four federal circuits have indicated 
that revocation of supervised release for use of even medicinal 
 
83 Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 365 (“If his supervision continues, he will probably 
end up in the almost endless cycle of supervised release and prison. Because the 
revocation statute requires jail time for drug use . . . , he is likely to be sent back to 
prison, to be followed by a term of supervised release, which, when violated, will 
again send him back to prison.”).  
84 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), (g) (2018).  
85 Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 348 (“In the Eastern District of New York, 13.45% 
of revocations are related to drug use . . . .”). 
86 Id. at 365.  
87 Id.  
88 See, e.g., United States v. Guess, 216 F. Supp. 3d 689, 698 (E.D. Va. 2016); 
United States v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (citing United 
States v. Friel, 699 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (D. Me. 2010)).  
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marijuana is proper.89  These holdings include cases where doc-
tors have duly prescribed marijuana for use in palliative care.90  
In an illustrative decision, the Eastern District of Michigan in 
United States v. Hicks equated the use of marijuana for palliative 
care to the recreational use of alcohol and other substances that 
may be restricted by supervised release.91  “[T]he Court reminds 
the Defendant that even if possessing medical marijuana was 
legal under federal law, which it is not, a court may restrict 
otherwise legal behavior of a defendant on supervised release.”92  
This decision is a clear embrace of the punitive purposes of su-
pervised release.  
This choice between jailing a user of legal marijuana or 
simply cutting her loose from supervision is confining, but it is 
one that will likely become ever more common as federal 
supervised release and state drug laws fall into greater tension.  
II.  STATE AND LOCAL MARIJUANA LAW 
The trend in state and local law over the last number of 
years has been toward legalization or decriminalization of mar-
ijuana use.93  As of this writing, thirty-three states and the 
District of Columbia have legalized medicinal marijuana; ten 
states and the District of Columbia have legalized the use of 
recreational marijuana.94  Fifteen additional states have decrimi-
nalized marijuana use within their borders.95  Four ballot meas-
ures approving the use of medicinal and recreational marijuana 
were passed during the 2018 midterm elections.96  Additionally, 
numerous municipalities have decriminalized the possession and 
 
89 See, e.g., United States v. Schostag, 895 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2018); 
United States v. Harvey, 659 F.3d 1272, 1273–74 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Bey, 341 F. Supp. 3d 528, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 835.  
90 Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 832, 835.  
91 Id. at 835.  
92 Id.  
93 United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 342–43 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).  
94 See Wu & Silva, supra note 14; see, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–
3369-e (McKinney 2018).  
95 German Lopez, 15 States Have Decriminalized–But Not Legalized–Marijuana, 
VOX (Jul. 10, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/20/17938358/ 
marijuana-legalization-decriminalization-states-map [https://perma.cc/Z5RU-JLZ8]. 
96 Tom Angell, Marijuana’s Ten Biggest Victories of 2018, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2018, 
2:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/12/06/marijuanas-ten-biggest-
victories-of-2018 [https://perma.cc/D3AD-W4U7] (citing medicinal marijuana ballot 
measures in Oklahoma, Missouri, and Utah, and a measure for recreational use in 
Michigan). 
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use of small amounts of marijuana.97  In May 2018, New York 
City was added to that list, with the mayor ordering the police to 
cease making arrests for petty possession of marijuana.98  
This overwhelming shift in state law stands in stark contrast 
to the lack of movement at the federal level.  Since 1970, the 
status of marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug under the CSA has 
been unwavering.99  Individuals are prohibited from obtaining or 
possessing any Schedule 1 substances under federal law, even by 
valid prescription.100  Schedule 1 is reserved for only the most 
serious drugs as determined by a combination of the following 
factors: (1) those with the highest “potential for abuse”; (2) those 
with “[s]cientific evidence of . . . pharmacological effect”; (3) “cur-
rent scientific knowledge regarding the drug or . . . substance”; 
(4) its “history and . . . pattern of abuse”; (5) “[t]he scope, dura-
tion, and significance of abuse”; (6) risk to health; (7) dependence; 
and (8) “[w]hether the substance is an immediate precursor” for 
another substance banned under the CSA.101  
Not only has the federal law’s “opinion” of marijuana, as 
evinced by its continued placement on Schedule 1, not evolved at 
the same speed that state and local governments have, the 
punishments for violation of the CSA also remain extremely 
strong.  Simple possession of marijuana carries a penalty of impris-
onment of not more than one year and a $1,000 fine for the first 
offense, a prison sentence of not more than two years and a 
$2,500 fine for the second offense, and not more than three years 
and a fine of $5,000 for the third offense.102  However, distri-
bution or possession with the intent to dispense even small 
amounts of marijuana may be penalized by up to five years in 
prison, a two-year mandatory stint of supervised release, and a 
fine of up to $250,000.103  Attempt or conspiracy to commit any of 
these crimes carries the same sentence as the completed crime.104  
 
97 Joseph Misulonas, 15 Largest Cities That Have Decriminalized Marijuana, 
CIVILIZED, https://www.civilized.life/articles/largest-cities-decriminalized-marijuana 
(last visited June 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6TP2-PM5D].  
98 Rachel Kaufman, NYC Mayor Taking Steps Toward Marijuana Decriminali-
zation, NEXT CITY (May 21, 2018), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nyc-mayor-taking-
steps-toward-marijuana-decriminalization [https://perma.cc/6XNL-5AY9].  
99 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2018). 
100 See United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 995 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing 
Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).  
101 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(1)–(8). 
102 Id. § 844(a).  
103 Id. § 841(b)(1)(D).  
104 Id. § 846.  
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Moreover, penalties are increased significantly if any of these 
acts are committed while maintaining a premises that is deemed 
to be “drug-involved,” or used or designated for the use, manufac-
ture, sale, or consumption of any controlled substances.105  The 
same is true if they are committed in proximity to a school,106 
involve a person under the age of twenty-one,107 or drug para-
phernalia.108  Additionally, if found guilty of any of the crimes 
under the CSA, Social Security and food stamp benefits may be 
revoked.109  These crimes are often stacked one on top of another 
to further stiffen the penalties for any activity having to do with 
marijuana or drugs in general.  
One exception to the above, where federal drug law has 
started to move, albeit at a snail’s pace, is the legalization of 
certain cannabidiol-based drugs used to treat epilepsy.110  Canna-
bidiol, or CBD, is a part of the marijuana plant that does not 
alter mood or consciousness, but has considerable therapeutic 
properties.111  In June 2018, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) approved the use of CBD for the treatment of seizures in 
certain severe cases of epilepsy.112  Even so, the federal law 
remains considerably behind the science in many other areas and 
potential uses of therapeutic cannabis.113   
The stiff federal guidelines and the ever-changing landscape 
of state law have come into active conflict in a number of areas.  
First, the most direct conflict between the federal law and state 
law took the form of Gonzalez v. Raich, the original test case for 
federal marijuana jurisprudence.114  In Raich, the Court, relying 
on its Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Wickard v. Filburn,115 
 
105 Id. § 856(a)–(b).  
106 Id. § 860(a).  
107 Id. § 859(a). 
108 Id. § 863(a)–(b). 
109 Id. § 862a(a).  
110 News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Drug 
Comprised of an Active Ingredient Derived from Marijuana To Treat Rare, Severe 
Forms of Epilepsy (June 25, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/ 
pressannouncements/ucm611046.htm [https://perma.cc/RX2F-PP3F].  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See generally NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF 
CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 85–86 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
books/NBK425767/ [https://perma.cc/SG3B-VM7R]. 
114 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2005).  
115 See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In his time-honored 
opinion, Justice Jackson famously defended the validity of the Agriculture Adjust-
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upheld the convictions of Angel Raich and Diane Monson, who 
both cultivated marijuana for home use as prescribed by licensed 
physicians in accordance with the California Compassionate Use 
Act.116  The Court announced that, under the Commerce Clause, 
Congress had the power to regulate the possession and use of me-
dicinal marijuana even when used on a small, intrastate scale.117  
Second, and perhaps most importantly to this Note, in response 
to presidential policy under the Obama administration and as a 
concession to get the federal budget passed in 2014, Congress 
defunded Justice Department prosecutions of marijuana-related 
crimes in states where marijuana is legal under state law.118  The 
Ninth Circuit has held that this serves to abrogate indictments 
brought by the Justice Department in violation of the funding 
bill.119  While this is not a conflict per se, it highlights the tension 
between the CSA and evolving societal views on marijuana use. 
This tension has created interesting questions of law in other 
areas as well.  For example, the Money Laundering and Control 
Act120 as well as the Bank Secrecy Act121 combine to make it dif-
ficult for state-sanctioned marijuana businesses to gain access to 
normalized banking relationships.122  These acts prohibit trans-
actions with the proceeds of criminal activity, including the sale 
of marijuana as proscribed by the CSA.123  They also prompt 
certain reporting requirements by the financial institution to the 
Federal Reserve that may raise suspicions around legitimate in-
state marijuana businesses.124  State-chartered banks, as recipi-
 
ment Act of 1938 that placed production limits on certain crops. Id. at 118–20. He 
argued that intrastate commercial regulation was valid pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In so doing, Justice Jackson 
announced the Commerce Clause doctrine of aggregation, namely that Congress 
may regulate any area of intrastate commerce which when taken together could 
rationally relate to, or affect, interstate commerce. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28. 
116 Raich, 545 U.S. at 6–7, 10.  
117 Id. at 32–33.  
118 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014).  
119 United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).  
120 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2018).  
121 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2018). 
122 Deborah L. Dickson, Bank on Marijuana: A Legitimate Industry Warranting 
Banking Access, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV. 459, 464 (2015). 
123 Id. at 463. 
124 Id. at 464–65. 
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ents of insurance through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, must also comply with these laws.125  
Additionally, the United States Trustee’s office has repeated-
ly blocked the reorganizations of state-sanctioned marijuana 
businesses in bankruptcy.126  When legal marijuana businesses 
have sought bankruptcy protection, the United States Trustee’s 
Office, a division of the Justice Department, has petitioned the 
bankruptcy court for dismissal of the case or for the forfeiture of 
all drug-related assets.127  The argument by the trustees has been 
that they cannot simultaneously administer the estate of the 
debtor and adhere to the provisions of the CSA.128 
These flashpoints all convey one common theme: how far 
state law has come, and how stubborn the federal law has been 
in dealing with drug-related developments.  Use of banking law, 
the Bankruptcy Code, and, as this Note argues, supervised 
release to tacitly prosecute marijuana crimes all combine to 
underline the reluctance of the federal government to relinquish 
mid-century conceptions of drug use.  Specifically, when the crim-
inal law is involved, several constitutional and prudential issues 
are implicated. 
III.  THE PROBLEMS 
A. Eighth Amendment Concerns 
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Denial of Medicinal 
Marijuana 
The Eighth Amendment proscribes the administration of cruel 
and unusual punishments.129  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
the amendment as embodying “ ‘broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against 
which we must evaluate penal measures.”130  Punishments must 
 
125 Matthew A. Melone, Federal Marijuana Policy: Homage to Federalism in 
Form; Potemkin Federalism in Substance, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 215, 231 (2018).  
126 Steven J. Boyajian, Just Say No to Drugs? Creditors Not Getting a Fair 
Shake When Marijuana-Related Cases Are Dismissed, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 25 
(2017). 
127 Id. at 24–25. 
128 Id. at 25, 74–75. 
129 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
130 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 
F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).  
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be measured according to “the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”131  
Therefore, the infliction of unnecessary suffering by failure 
to provide medical care to federal prisoners qualifies as cruel and 
unusual.132  However, not all denials of medicine rise to the level 
of a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Rather, such violations 
must encompass a “deliberate indifference” to the medical needs 
of the prisoner.133  Therefore, defendants are not entitled to any 
medicine they choose, but they must be provided with medicine 
commensurate with a minimal standard of care and which re-
lieves pain that is unnecessary to achieving penological goals.134  
It seems, therefore, that based on the evolving standard of 
decency that courts must embody in their Eighth Amendment 
analyses, as cannabis becomes the standard and accepted treat-
ment for certain diseases, a court must not deny it to a super-
visee simply because they are being punished.  
Indeed, recent medical scholarship has started to identify cer-
tain conditions that respond best to cannabis-based medicines.135  
For example, CBD, a part of the marijuana plant that does not 
alter consciousness, has been shown to uniquely aid in the treat-
ment of epilepsy as well as chronic pain.136  CBD-based drugs are 
now considered a viable and uniquely effective treatment of 
epilepsy and are authorized for use by the FDA.137 
The implications of marijuana as a vital drug to treat 
epilepsy and chronic pain have strong Eighth Amendment impli-
cations.  The government cannot restrict the ability of prisoners 
to access their needed medicine simply because they are being 
punished, especially when there may not be other medicines to 
treat that specific condition.138  Therefore, supervisees, who are 
 
131 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
132 Id. at 103 (“These elementary principles establish the government’s obli-
gation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”).  
133 Id. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
134 See id. at 105–06.  
135 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 113, at 86–87. 
136 Jon Johnson, Everything You Need To Know About CBD Oil, MEDICAL NEWS 
TODAY (Jul. 27, 2018), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/317221.php 
[https://perma.cc/G572-6JVQ]. 
137 Id. 
138 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A state has an 
affirmative obligation under the Eighth Amendment ‘to provide persons in its 
custody with a medical care system that meets minimal standards of adequacy.’ ” 
(quoting Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985))).  
248 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:231   
also protected by the Eight Amendment,139 may not be punished 
with the deprivation of required medicines that meet the current 
medical standard.140  As the science around the use of marijuana 
products for therapeutic purposes develops, the supervised 
release statutes that require incarceration or termination for pos-
session of any cannabis-based substances are susceptible to 
constitutional challenge pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.  
The federal government, through the FDA, has admitted that 
CBD has certain unique therapeutic properties for various dis-
eases.141  This admission puts all statutes that proscribe its use 
for prisoners on conceptually precarious constitutional footing.  
2. The Proportionality Principle of the Eighth Amendment 
In addition to proscribing the denial of medical care to those 
in its care, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amend-
ment also embodies a proportionality principle that requires 
punishments not be grossly disproportionate to their underlying 
crime.142  The Court announced this principle in Solem v. Helm.  
In Solem, the Court held that a life sentence without possibility 
of parole for a seven-time financial crime offender was constitu-
tionally disproportionate.143  The Court reasoned that since the 
concept of proportionality existed at common law since the days 
of the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights,144 that the 
Eighth Amendment, adopted with those precepts in mind, 
certainly encompassed the very same principle.145  The Court re-
lied heavily on its own opinions in Weems v. United States and 
Robinson v. California to prove an unbroken chain of propor-
tionality jurisprudence dating back to the common law.146  In 
Weems, the Court noted that the method of punishment for an 
individual convicted of falsifying a public document—fifteen 
years of hard labor in iron chains—violated the Eighth Amend-
ment, because the punishment was “cruel in its excess of 
 
139 Carnell v. Paterson, 385 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence to claims emanating from supervised release, but ulti-
mately finding qualified immunity).  
140 Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 411 (citing Benson, 761 F.2d at 339). 
141 See News Release, supra note 110. 
142 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285–86 (1983).  
143 Id. at 303.  
144 Id. at 284–85.  
145 Id. at 285–86.  
146 Id. at 286–87 (first citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 372–73, 
377 (1910); and then citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). 
2020] REVOKING SUPERVISED RELEASE 249 
imprisonment.”147  In Robinson, echoing the sentiments of Judge 
Weinstein in Trotter, the Court held that sentencing an individ-
ual for his or her addiction to narcotics was invalid because 
imposing jail time based on a condition without a further act 
cannot be proportionate punishment.148  “Even one day in prison 
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of 
having a common cold.”149 
Solem announced a cogent doctrinal structure for assessing 
proportionality challenges.150  The Court recommended a tripar-
tite analysis.  First, the reviewing court must compare the nature 
and gravity of the sentence imposed with the nature and gravity 
of the crime committed and the culpability of the defendant.151  
Second, the court should compare the sentence to other sentences 
imposed in the same jurisdiction for similar crimes.152  Lastly, the 
court should compare the sentence with sentences imposed in 
other jurisdictions for similar crimes.153  
However, this analytical system was called into question in 
Harmelin v. Michigan.154  The Court, in a fractured set of opin-
ions, upheld a life sentence for an individual found to be in 
possession of 672 grams of cocaine.155  Justice Scalia and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist rejected the idea that the Constitution con-
tains a proportionality principle at all.156  Scalia and Rehnquist 
sharply criticized Justice Powell’s historical analysis in Solem 
and argued that there is no basis for the claim that the Eighth 
Amendment incorporated a proportionality principle exigent in 
the common law.157  However, Scalia’s caustic rejection of the 
Solem opinion notwithstanding, seven justices in Harmelin voted 
to uphold the proportionality principle.158  But Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, in which Justices O’Connor and Souter joined, 
severely limited the scope of Solem.159  They held that the propor-
 
147 Weems, 217 U.S. at 377. 
148 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. 
149 Id. 
150 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
151 Id. at 290, 294–95.  
152 Id. at 291. 
153 Id. at 291–92.  
154 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985–87 (1991) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 
290–91).  
155 Id. at 957, 961.  
156 Id. at 965.  
157 Id. at 966–67.  
158 See id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting).  
159 Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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tionality principle is reserved for only “grossly disproportionate” 
sentences.160  Therefore, courts should hold off on employing the 
Solem proportionality analysis unless a preliminary showing can 
be made that a punishment is “grossly disproportionate” to the 
crime committed.161  
In Miller v. Alabama, Justice Kagan reaffirmed and elucidated 
this structure.162  She noted that proportionality must be viewed 
“less through a historical prism than according to ‘the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,’ ” the very same standards required for all other “cruel 
and unusual punishment” determinations under the Eighth 
Amendment.163  To aid in establishing whether a certain sentenc-
ing scheme violates these “evolving standards of decency,” the 
Court must consider the relationship between the sentence, the 
crime, the culpability of the offender, and the “national consen-
sus” regarding the use of that type of punishment for similar 
crimes.164  If there is a consensus that a certain punishment may 
not be employed then such a punishment cannot be con-
stitutional.165 
While the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has 
been in flux at times, four things are clear: (1) a proportionality 
principle is embodied in the Eighth Amendment;166 (2) the prin-
ciple applies to noncapital cases;167 (3) any punishment must be 
weighed against the gravity of the offense committed and the 
relative culpability of the offender;168 and (4) the analysis will 
look to how the crime is punished in other jurisdictions.169 
Because the imposition of supervised release and its revoca-
tion are all incidents of the original crime committed, all the 
 
160 Id. at 1005 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281 (1980)).  
161 Id. 
162 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2012) (first citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); and then citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
59 (2010)). 
163 Id. at 469 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
164 Id. at 469, 482 (first quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; and then quoting 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 61).  
165 See id. at 482–83.  
166 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
167 Id. at 997 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271–74 & n.11 (1980)).  
168 Miller, 567 U.S. at 470.  
169 Id. at 482 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 61); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 
1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analy-
ses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the 
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross dispro-
portionality.”). 
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conditions of supervised release are necessarily open to scrutiny 
on Eighth Amendment grounds as punishments.170  Regardless of 
its form, once something is established as a punishment, the 
Eighth Amendment applies.171  Therefore, the imposition of a mari-
juana condition, and any instances of revocation related to that 
condition, must be proportionate to the underlying crime being 
punished.172 
3. Supervised Release Conditions That Deny Use of Therapeutic 
Marijuana Violate the Proportionality Principle 
As Judge Weinstein observed in Trotter, penalizing use of 
marijuana can have the effect of morphing relatively small sen-
tences into life sentences served in installments,173 a sentence 
that is manifestly unjust for the use of a potentially therapeutic 
product.  Each drug charge can land a violator up to two years in 
prison, followed by up to five years of supervised release de-
pending on the infraction.174  If that term of supervised release is 
violated as a result of drug use, the judge has little choice but to 
sentence the violator to more jail and possibly more supervised 
release.175  The cycle can go on and on.  Unlike Solem, the term of 
imprisonment is not simply life in jail, but rather the continued 
denigration of jail, violation, arrest, and more jail, all for a sub-
stance that is legal in a majority of states for either therapeutic 
or recreational purposes.176  Revoking an individual’s liberty as a 
result of use of a therapeutic product while turning a blind eye to 
progressing science on the matter is tantamount to arbitrary 
 
170 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). 
171 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–99 
(1989). 
172 Cf. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700 (noting that, unless “postrevocation sanctions” 
are considered “part of the penalty for the initial offense,” double jeopardy issues 
would arise).  
173 United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“For 
some, supervised release can be a trap where they bounce between supervision and 
prison. ‘Violations of [supervised release] frequently cause a return to prison, often 
with new supervisory terms attached. This has created the “threat of never-ending 
supervision.” ’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Nora V. Demleitner, How To Change 
the Philosophy and Practice of Probation and Supervised Release: Data Analytics, 
Cost Control, Focus on Reentry, and a Clear Mission, 28 FED. SENT’G REP., no. 4, 
2016, at 232)). 
174 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 844(a) (2018).  
175 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (2018) (providing that “the court shall revoke” supervised 
release for possession of controlled substances (emphasis added)). 
176 See Wu & Silva, supra note 14. 
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penological behavior and is grossly disproportionate to the act 
committed. 
In dealing with this very issue, Judge Weinstein used a 
similar doctrinal analysis to the Court in Harmelin and Miller.  
First, he compared the sentence to the gravity of the crime 
committed.177  Finding that smoking marijuana is essentially a 
victimless act, and one for which he would be required to 
prescribe jail time under the supervised release statutes,178  he 
argued that doing so would be simply unjust.179  He also ad-
dressed the fact that New York City, where Trotter lived, had in 
essence decriminalized the use of marijuana altogether.180  This 
two-pronged analysis—weighing culpability against the punish-
ment and then comparing punishments in other jurisdictions—is 
the hallmark of a proportionality analysis.181   
Those who oppose this view will certainly point to the 
Supreme Court’s oft repeated maxim from Johnson: revocation of 
supervised release is an incident of a previous crime—not the 
current conduct.182  While it is true that a defendant who com-
mits a crime bears the responsibility for his supervision in the 
first place, that does not simply open her up to any form of 
punishment the government chooses; the punishment still must 
comport with the Eighth Amendment.183  The principle at the 
heart of the Eighth Amendment is that the punishment must fit 
the crime and must not be rejected by a majority of jurisdictions 
in the nation.184  However, when the supervisee is using marijuana 
for therapeutic reasons, punishing her for following a physician’s 
prescription creates a never-ending cycle of jail and supervised 
release, serving little to no purpose,185 and is disavowed by the 
criminal laws of a majority of states.186  Therefore, restricting 
 
177 Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 341 (“No useful purpose is served through the 
continuation of supervised release for many defendants whose only illegal conduct is 
following the now largely socially acceptable habit of marijuana use.”). 
178 Id. at 340–41, 343. 
179 Id. at 363.  
180 Id. at 343 (refrencing announcements by the Manhattan and Brooklyn Dis-
trict Attorneys and the New York City mayor regarding systematic non-enforcement 
of marijuana-related criminal statutes in the city) .  
181 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2012).  
182 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). 
183 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285–86 (1983).  
184 Id. at 290–92. 
185 Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 365.  
186 See Wu & Silva, supra note 14. 
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access to medicinal marijuana likely offends the proportionality 
principle.  
Furthermore, when an individual is in need of a drug for 
therapeutic purposes, the idea that punishing her for using it 
promotes respect for the law, deterrence, or any other penological 
goal is weak at best.  A person in need of a drug will likely violate 
her supervised release to get physical relief.  Therefore, withhold-
ing therapeutic marijuana from supervisees does not serve any 
penological goals.  When a punishment becomes completely un-
moored from its penological underpinnings, it becomes unprinci-
pled and arbitrary.187  Arbitrary punishments cannot withstand a 
proportionality analysis because there is no link between the 
crime and the punishment in the first place.188  Therefore, even if 
the length of a marijuana sentence were per se reasonable, it 
would still fail an Eighth Amendment test for want of penological 
reasoning.  Without a rationale for a punishment, it is impossible 
to measure its reasonableness. 
B. Constitutional Issues: Separation of Powers Concerns 
The procedure that allows judges to revoke supervised re-
lease upon report by a probation officer alone removes all 
prosecutorial discretion from the executive branch and vests that 
power in the judicial branch.  In other areas of the law, “the Ex-
ecutive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to 
decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”189  This “exclusive au-
thority” is far reaching.190  For example, a United States Attorney 
may decide against pursuing a prosecution after a grand jury has 
returned an indictment.191  “The discretionary power of the 
attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecu-
tion shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon 
matters of policy wholly apart from any question of probable 
cause.”192  Similar to the role of a jury, the United States Attorney 
acts as a sort of conscience of the community when deciding when 
 
187 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 322–23 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
188 Id. 
189 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing The Confiscation 
Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965)).  
190 Id. 
191 Cox, 342 F.2d at 170–71. 
192 Id. at 171.  
254 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:231   
and how to pursue a prosecution.193  She may decide that certain 
cases are simply not important enough to prosecute.194  The exec-
utive branch may decide when to enforce laws and when not to 
enforce laws when acting for the people,195 and this power is 
largely unreviewable by courts.196  A judge cannot be forced to 
grant mandamus relief to force a prosecutor to bring a case or to 
stop a case from being brought.197  Prior to the case being admit-
ted to the judicial process, the cause of action is “owned” by the 
people, and the United States Attorney acts on their behalf in the 
public trust.  
This power is a central feature of the scheme of checks and 
balances and separation of powers.198  By spreading power through-
out the various governmental branches, prosecutorial discretion 
bolsters the Constitution’s clear bias against the deprivation of 
liberty while favoring due process.199  James Madison wrote in 
Federalist Paper No. 47 that “[w]hen the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person or body . . . , 
there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute 
them in a tyrannical manner.”200  Justice Jackson, in his opinion 
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube, famously argued that “the 
Constitution diffuses power . . . to secure liberty.”201  When all 
power to remove liberty is vested in one branch of government, 
the ability for another branch to check that power evaporates.202 
In a 2013 D.C. Circuit case, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who 
would years later become Associate Justice Brett Kavanaugh of 
the Supreme Court, echoed this sentiment:  
The Executive’s broad prosecutorial discretion and pardon pow-
ers illustrate a key point of the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.  One of the greatest unilateral powers a President pos-
sesses under the Constitution, at least in the domestic sphere, is 
 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
195 Id. at 192 (citing United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412–413, 415 
(1920); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 249, 251 (1932)).  
196 Id. 
197 Id. (citing Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463, 464–65 (7th Cir. 1955)). 
198 Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power 
To Protect Liberty, 97 B.U.L. REV. 489, 528 (2017).  
199 Id. at 529–30.  
200 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  
201 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
202 Markowitz, supra note 198, at 528–29.  
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the power to protect individual liberty by essentially under-
enforcing federal statutes regulating private behavior . . . .  
[T]he President’s prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers 
operate as an independent protection for individual citizens 
against the enforcement of oppressive laws that Congress may 
have passed . . . .203  
Justice Kavanaugh’s view of prosecutorial misconduct hints 
at the importance of prosecutorial discretion in situations where 
the law being enforced is controversial or oppressive.  Mechanical 
incarceration for use of marijuana, as prescribed by the federal 
supervised release statutes, is certainly an area where the 
public’s view, as evidenced by state and local law, differs from 
congressional law making.204  Therefore, depriving the Executive 
of its prosecutorial discretion in this area seems to flout the very 
scheme that the Framers aimed to establish through the 
Constitution.205 
However, courts have generally declined to extend the doc-
trine of prosecutorial discretion to revocation hearings.206  Courts 
have held that revocation is not a prosecution, but rather a 
custodial hearing fully within the realm of the judicial branch.207  
In so holding, they have stuck to a narrow interpretation of the 
statutes that vest judges with the power to conduct supervised 
release hearings208 and ignored the policy concerns central to the 
concept of prosecutorial discretion in general. 
In United States v. Mejia-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit tersely 
summarized the prevailing judicial philosophy with regard to 
supervised release and prosecutorial discretion, holding that, 
since the supervised release statutes clearly allow for judicial ini-
tiation of proceedings, the United States Attorney’s prosecutorial 
discretion is implicitly limited.209  The court held that, since “[a] 
district court has supervisory authority over and maintains a 
 
203 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
204 United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citations 
omitted). 
205 Markowitz, supra note 198, at 531 (explaining that the constitutional frame-
work is bolstered by strong prosecutorial discretion, because constitutional bias 
skews against any deprivation of liberty). 
206 See, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Sanchez, 172 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(citations omitted); United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(citations omitted). 
207 See Mejia-Sanchez, 172 F.3d at 1175 (citations omitted). 
208 See id. at 1174 (relying, in part, on a narrow construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3603 
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209 Id. at 1175. 
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relationship of trust with a defendant on supervised release,” a 
revocation is not a prosecution but rather a consequence for 
breaching the court’s trust.210 
But this narrow construction of prosecutorial discretion 
seems to run counter to constitutional law’s overarching policy-
driven reason for vesting prosecutorial discretion in the executive 
branch in the first place—the executive branch acts as a check on 
the judicial and legislative branches.211  When we examine the con-
stitutional sources of prosecutorial discretion, an alternative view 
of revocation proceedings emerges.  Professor Peter Markowitz, 
in his article Prosecutorial Discretion at its Zenith: The Power To 
Protect Liberty, argues that various clauses of the Constitution, 
as well as its structure and philosophy, all support an expansive 
view of prosecutorial discretion.212  Professor Markowitz suggests 
a number of textual sources for the power.213  He argues that the 
power may emanate from the Take Care Clause, from the Article 
II Vesting Clause, or more likely from the President’s pardon 
power.214  Markowitz argues that since the Take Care Clause 
charges the Executive with responsibilities, it has diminished 
force as a textual source of power.215  The Article II Vesting 
Clause is a direct grant of power, but it does not come with much 
jurisprudential history and is therefore limited in its usefulness 
in understanding prosecutorial discretion.216 
However, the pardon power is a specific power for the Exec-
utive, with a well-developed jurisprudential history, and arguably 
subsumes the power of prosecutorial discretion.217  The Execu-
tive, pursuant to the pardon power, may exonerate individual 
defendants in any stage of the criminal prosecution, before or 
even after conviction.218  This sweeping power is the closest to our 
modern-day conception of prosecutorial discretion as a power 
vested in the Executive to under-enforce the laws, thereby pro-
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viding implicit pardons as a check on the power of Congress.219  
The power cannot be modified, diminished, or limited by Con-
gress.220  Moreover, the power to pardon has been understood to 
vest the Executive with the power to provide wide-ranging 
amnesty with respect to any type of enforcement actions that the 
Executive determines to be against the public interest.221  This 
power extends to any “[o]ffenses against the United States,” 
which Professor Markowitz argues is inclusive language that 
includes non-criminal proceedings as well as criminal pros-
ecutions.222 
In a case bearing some similarities to supervised release, the 
Supreme Court endorsed a wide-ranging pardon power that ex-
tends beyond the reaches of criminal proceedings.  In Ex Parte 
Grossman, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant was 
sentenced to civil contempt for violating a district court injunc-
tion, the President could intervene and pardon that individual 
from her resulting contempt penalties.223  The case involved pres-
idential intervention in the enforcement of Prohibition-era anti-
alcohol laws, perhaps a corollary to today’s marijuana laws.224  
Seemingly speaking directly to our issue, Chief Justice Taft 
wrote: “[t]hat which violates the dignity and authority of federal 
courts such as an intentional effort to defeat their decrees 
justifying punishment violates a law of the United States, and so 
must be an offense against the United States” and subject to the 
pardon power of the President.225  Just because the offense in-
volves a breach of the court’s trust does not automatically remove 
such offense from the limiting actions of the Executive; rather, 
the concepts of the separation of powers continue to operate.226  
He went on to state that: 
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness 
or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the 
criminal law.  The administration of justice by the courts is not 
necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circum-
stances which may properly mitigate guilt.  To afford a remedy, 
it has always been thought essential in popular governments, as 
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well as in monarchies, to vest in some other authority than the 
courts power to ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judg-
ments.  It is a check entrusted to the [E]xecutive for special 
cases.  To exercise it to the extent of destroying the deterrent 
effect of judicial punishment would be to prevent it; but whoever 
is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it.  Our 
Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the 
nation in confidence that he will not abuse it.227 
The sweeping power contemplated by the Taft Court is clearly 
one that would embrace an executive role in revocation of super-
vision, even if the proceeding is custodial and not prosecutorial.  
When prosecutorial discretion is viewed as derivative of the 
pardon power, it is difficult to understand why it would not apply 
to supervised release.  And yet, “prosecutions” for violation of su-
pervised release are not only not subject to the prosecutorial 
discretion of the United States Attorney, but they are under the 
complete control of the probation officer and the sentencing 
judge.228  They may be initiated by the probation officer or the 
judge on an ex parte basis and do not require the assent of the 
United States Attorney.229  Allowing ex parte prosecutions like 
these are not only likely outside of the framer’s vision,230 but are 
more akin to a star-chamber inquest231 than free, just, and 
adversarial proceedings in our American system.232 
The absence of prosecutorial discretion from revocation 
proceedings removes a potentially protective layer from those 
subject to prosecution.  If the United States Attorney were re-
quired to move the court to revoke supervised release, the 
defendant would have the benefit of the discretion of both the 
United States Attorney and the judge.  Both the executive and 
judicial branches would have a chance to decide if revoking 
supervised release were wise.  But when a judge and a probation 
officer are responsible for making the decision themselves, only 
one branch of government reviews the charges.  Unless the judge 
 
227 Id. at 120–21.  
228 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b); United States v. Feinberg, 631 F.2d 388, 390–91 
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is inclined to discontinue supervision entirely, when a cannabis-
related violation is reported, the judge is bound by statute to 
send the violator back to prison.233  The system is set up in an 
extremely inflexible manner, with a bias towards punishment 
rather than rehabilitation.  This bias towards punishment is the 
inverse of our Constitution’s overall bias against revocation of 
liberty and in favor of due process.234  
Of course, one could contend that when the prosecutor 
brought the original case against the supervisee, she did so 
knowing that one of the punishments that may be levied against 
the supervisee would be revocation of release for a drug-related 
violation, and thus the prosecutor has already used her discre-
tion.  While this is true, the public view on marijuana has been 
quick to evolve and may change significantly between the time of 
an initial prosecution and a revocation proceeding.235  The legal 
and scientific landscape is ever-changing, and relying on prosecu-
torial decisions made years before a potential revocation 
proceeding only reinforces the lack of flexibility in the system 
and does nothing to foster the underlying policies behind 
prosecutorial discretion. 
C. Prudential Concerns 
One more result of the conflict between the federal sentenc-
ing regime and state drug law is a perceived lack of clarity as to 
what behavior is permitted while on supervision and what is not.  
In United States v. Parker, for example, the D.C. District Court 
had to clarify whether a defendant’s participation in the D.C. 
medical marijuana program for relief from severe migraines 
caused by bullet fragments lodged in his skull qualified as a 
violation of supervised release.236  The court found that it would 
have been a violation, but because the defendant did not know 
that his participation in the program would violate his release, it 
declined to recommend revocation.237  The Justice Department 
also asked the court to rule on whether the United States 
Attorney’s office could participate in the hearings after a 2014 
budget measure removed the Justice Department’s funding for 
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any prosecutions that would run counter to any state marijuana 
legalization measures.238  The court acknowledged the issue but 
declined to review it, given that the Justice Department was not 
actually petitioning for revocation, but rather asking for clarifica-
tion as to what may constitute a violation.239  This lack of clarity 
is extraordinary and is causing harm to the judicial and penal 
systems in a number of ways, including sowing a lack of 
predictability for defendants in revocation proceedings and 
causing a large divergence between the penalties for violations 
for supervised release as opposed to fresh prosecutions for 
marijuana possession.240 
1. Predictability in Sentencing 
Not surprisingly, the conflicts between state and federal law 
have created an extremely messy body of law, unmoored from 
any guiding doctrinal principles.  Ironically, the same supervised 
release statutes that were adopted as a means of promoting 
consistency and fairness in sentencing241 have backfired.  While 
many courts continue to mechanically follow the default sentenc-
ing rules,242 certain judges like Judge Weinstein, understanding 
that there has been a sea change in societal thinking on mari-
juana, have started to veer from the norm.243  This reality has 
reintroduced uncertainty and unfairness into the justice system.  
Certain individuals get thrown in jail for use of marijuana in 
violation of supervised release conditions, while others have their 
supervision terminated early for the very same behavior.  When 
a defendant goes before a tribunal and has no idea what kind of 
sentence she will receive, that defendant’s view of the fairness of 
that tribunal is called into question.  
2. Congressional Intervention 
Adding more confusion to the system, in a 2014 deal to keep 
the government funded, Congress slashed funding to the Justice 
Department for marijuana-related prosecutions.244  In a conces-
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sion to President Obama, the Republican-controlled Congress 
voted to defund all efforts by the Justice Department to enforce 
federal drug laws in states that had voted to legalize medicinal 
marijuana.245  Specifically, the Justice Department was barred 
from spending money on prosecutions that could interfere with 
state deregulation schemes.246  This momentary concession was 
re-codified in subsequent budget bills as well.247 
The Ninth Circuit has held that this bar on Justice Depart-
ment spending acts to abrogate prosecutions brought under the 
CSA in states that have legalized medicinal marijuana.248  The 
court held that even though a prosecutor had decided to bring a 
case against certain marijuana growers in California, Congress’s 
tacit disapproval of this policy as embodied in the budget bill 
rendered the prosecutor’s charges invalid.249  Ultimately, the 
United States Attorney’s continued pursuit of the case violated 
the Appropriations Clause because her office was essentially 
drawing money from the Treasury without the approval of 
Congress.250 
However, supervised release proceedings remain unaffected.251  
The fact that fresh prosecutions for marijuana are prohibited in 
jurisdictions where state law has legalized medicinal use,252  but 
the supervised release laws continue to act with the same force253 
serves to further confuse the issue.  This difference between su-
pervised release law and fresh prosecutions have allowed judges 
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is prosecuting crimes that otherwise would not be prosecuted.  
Running a system that consistently endorses disparate and con-
fusing outcomes runs the risk of denigrating the reputation of the 
courts and the Justice Department.  The United States District 
Court in United States v. Guess seized on this very issue—
reasoning that the government’s decision to prosecute individuals 
for marijuana use based on their geography alone creates 
concerns of unequal prosecution and unwarranted sentencing 
disparities.254  Continuing to run revocation proceedings as sepa-
rate from fresh marijuana prosecutions runs the risk of further 
muddying the waters in the conflict between state and federal 
law.  
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
While it is doubtful that there is support in Congress for a 
wholesale amendment of the supervised release statutes or the 
CSA, there are a number of smaller measures that can be used to 
partially alleviate the constitutional and prudential concerns 
raised above.  First, doing away with the mandatory no-drugs 
condition for supervisees255 would deal with many of these issues.  
Second, requiring that drug-related revocations for supervised 
release be available only upon motion by the United States At-
torney would alleviate separation of powers issues.  Third, those 
supervisees who have their supervision revoked as a result of 
medicinal marijuana use should assert claims for constitutional 
torts.  These measures, while partial, could go a long way to re-
duce unfairness in this area of the criminal justice system.  
A. Doing Away with Mandatory Conditions 
An elegant solution to the issues presented above is actually 
hidden in the sentencing statutes themselves.  The statutes re-
quire certain conditions be imposed in every supervised release 
case, while they also allow judges to add certain discretionary 
conditions if they comport with the section 3553(a) factors.256  The 
section 3553(a) factors embody various penological goals and give 
guidance to judges on when and how to apply punishment to 
certain defendants.257  Most importantly, they allow the court to 
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customize the conditions placed on a supervisee while also stay-
ing within the bounds prescribed by law.  This begs the question: 
Why not allow judges to craft all release conditions in accordance 
with these factors?  Allowing such a regime would allow judges to 
impose conditions on a case-by-case basis, and it would not require 
 
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The court shall impose 
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in deter-
mining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
* * * 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner; 
* * * 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any 
amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress 
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be 
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amend-
ments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on 
the date the defendant is sentenced; or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the 
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, 
United States Code, taking into account any amendments 
made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Con-
gress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be 
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments 
issued under section 994(p) of title 28); 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amend-
ments made to such policy statement by act of Congress 
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incor-
porated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments 
issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the 
date the defendant is sentenced[;] 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.  
Id. § 3553. 
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judges to deal with mandatory conditions that hem in their 
ability to deal fairly with each defendant. 
Allowing judges to set all the conditions of release would also 
require judges to take into consideration any access to medica-
tions, including marijuana, that each individual defendant may 
need.  It would also promote a tailored and proportional approach 
to punishment in accordance with section 3553(a)(2)(D).  Much of 
the consternation caused by the current system comes as a result 
of the wooden nature of the drug conditions and the revocation 
requirement.  Allowing for maximum flexibility will put the super-
vised release regime in line with the greater sentencing frame-
work and allow for fairer outcomes.258 
Judge Weinstein acknowledged the viability of a tailored ap-
proach in Trotter and also suggested a different, yet similar 
approach based on the section 3553(a) factors.259  Judge Weinstein 
argued that since the supervised release statutes already allow 
for termination of supervision after a year, if justice so requires 
and the decision comports with the section 3553(a) factors,260  
judges should be required to hold a hearing after a year of 
supervision to decide if continuing supervision promotes the 
goals of the section 3553(a) factors.261 
While these approaches may increase the uncertainty in 
sentencing, they will also increase the fairness of each individual 
proceeding.  In a system where conditions are tailored to each 
defendant, a judge will be required to show how applying a 
condition comports with the penological goals set out in 
section 3553(a) and explain that rationale to the defendant.  That 
rationale will also be subject to appellate review.  While the 
outcomes will be more disparate, they will also be more trans-
parent and more fair. 
B. Requiring Adversarial Hearings for Cannabis-Related 
Violations of Supervised Release 
In an effort to alleviate the potential constitutional issues 
posed by denying the executive branch its prosecutorial discre-
tion in such a hotly contested area of law, the Federal Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure should be amended to require a motion by 
the United States to commence a revocation proceeding for 
cannabis-related violations.262  Because of the unique place that 
cannabis occupies in our criminal law at this moment, having a 
dual layer of discretion acting as the conscience of the community 
is important.  Both in Aiken County and in Grossman, the courts 
embraced a sweeping view of executive power when hotly con-
tested issues of law were in question.263  When an area of law is a 
potential fount of complaints of unfairness, allowing two govern-
mental branches to have a say will likely save the judicial branch 
from unneeded doubt and promote fairness in general. 
Not only would this wrest complete control of the revocation 
proceeding away from the judiciary, but it would allow these 
hearings to comport with more traditional adversary hearings 
and promote the constitutional bias against deprivations of 
liberty.264  The prosecutor would be a gatekeeper to valueless 
revocation proceedings that do not serve any penological goals.  
Adding an additional layer of review to the revocation process 
would likely filter out those proceedings that have the least peno-
logical merit and increase the fervor with which the government 
can pursue the ones with the most merit.  Given the scarcity of 
resources within the Justice Department, United States Attor-
neys will be forced to prioritize those cases that need the most 
attention.  More cases would be resolved with pleas, and the strain 
on the court system would be reduced. 
C. Constitutional Torts 
Absent Congress feverishly working to adopt the humble 
policy suggestions contained above, it is likely that those faced 
with revocation for use of necessary medicinal marijuana could 
bring plausible civil actions under the Eighth Amendment pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Section 1983 provides for a private right 
of action for those who have had their constitutional rights 
abridged.265  As described above, the Eighth Amendment requires 
that those subject to governmental punishment have access to 
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standard medical care.266  Given that supervisees are protected 
by the Eighth Amendment, the government should not be able to, 
as an incident of supervised release, deprive access rights to in-
dividuals who truly need medicinal marijuana.  Based on the pre-
vailing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, an individual denied 
use of a medicine, duly prescribed, should have a valid tort action 
against the government.  
While a supervisee need not be given her choice of medicine 
for the government to comply with the Constitution,267 there are 
cases where cannabis may be the only medically indicated 
remedy.  The FDA has already recognized CBD in the realm of 
epilepsy,268 and as the science develops this will certainly not be 
the only area where cannabis is indicated.  If a doctor duly pre-
scribes medicinal marijuana and the government remains delib-
erately indifferent to the need for the medication, a constitutional 
tort will likely arise. 
Federal prisoners in California have brought multiple cases 
based on this theory.269  While no court has foreclosed the possi-
bility of relief, the cases have either not met the specific elements 
of the cause of action, or they have been deficiently pleaded.  In 
Harris v. Lake County Jail, the plaintiff did not have a valid 
prescription for the medicine that he wanted to obtain, and 
therefore he was not even allowed to use medicinal marijuana 
under state law.270  While in El-Shaddai v. Zamora, the pro se 
plaintiff failed to properly plead the section 1983 action and had 
his case dismissed on procedural grounds, he was granted leave 
to amend, indicating a possibility that the claim could be pleaded 
properly.271  While these cases have not been successful, perhaps 
through these kinds of actions change will eventually come. 
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CONCLUSION 
The confluence of the federal supervised release regime and 
changing state marijuana laws have created an unjust system 
where certain prisoners have their supervision revoked for mari-
juana infractions, while others have their terms of release ter-
minated as a result of their violations.  The government must 
deal with a host of constitutional and prudential issues that arise 
as a result of these diverging bodies of law.  This Note has argued 
that allowing judges more discretion in crafting supervised re-
lease conditions, requiring adversarial hearings for revocation, 
and bringing possible tort actions may be partial solutions to 
these serious and ever-growing issues. 
